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ers and employees and the supervision of site 
activities. Furthermore, guidelines, protocols 
and checklists should be clear and transpar-
ent to staff. This is particularly important with 
regard to organ donation and the transplant 
process where evidence-based practices have 
to be monitored, reinforced and implement-
ed at a system-wide level. Especially in this 
healthcare field, managers and coordinators 
should be cognizant that they have a vital role 
in supporting positive health and safety behav-
iour of professional workers. The multi-disci-
plinary approach of different professionals in 
terms of knowledge and competences must be 
considered a crucial factor in improving the 
likelihood of donor acquisition.1 Therefore, 
1 The skills and competences required depend on the role 
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Abstract
A shared safety culture among healthcare profes-
sionals increases successful donation-transplant 
outcomes. A perfectly planned integration could re-
duce the possibility of failed organ transplantation 
and damage to the patient. Clear and understan-
dable systematic team training projects covering 
communication aspects linked to practice procedu-
res could improve the quality of the whole process.
Una cultura della sicurezza, condivisa tra i professioni-
sti sanitari, incrementa la riuscita del processo donazio-
ne-trapianto. Un’integrazione perfettamente pianifica-
ta può ridurre la possibilità di fallimento nel trapianto 
d’organo e di danno al paziente. Progetti formativi chia-
ri e comprensibili rivolti al gruppo di lavoro, orientati 
ad aspetti comunicativi e connessi a procedure pratiche, 
possono migliorare la qualità dell’intero processo. 
Introduction
Healthcare organizations are setting tighter safety requirements and are looking for 
ways to control quality, safety and efficiency in 
order to improve health outcomes. They should 
provide planning procedures and standards for 
all aspects of critical work and mechanisms for 
reviewing and monitoring them with an effec-
tive supervision in order to identify possible 
routes of errors from human factors. The ob-
jective is to close the gap between the best evi-
dence based practice and what really happens 
in current practice, which can lead to errors or 
adverse events. Key elements for the effective 
organization of health and safety management 
are communication and cooperation among 
all team members, the competence of manag-
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to reflect increasing generative levels of safety 
culture in healthcare.3 Leaders could support 
safety through specific actions and behaviours 
encouraging all team members to accept re-
sponsibility for their safety as well as that of 
their co-workers and patients. Therefore, an 
important step in promoting patient safety is 
the development of a healthy workplace.4 
To achieve such a culture requires a funda-
mental improvement in the correct under-
standing of the values, beliefs and norms about 
what is important in a health organization and 
which attitudes and behaviours related to pa-
tients safety are expected and appropriate.5 
From this point of view, the generative organi-
zation represents the most advanced state of 
cultural maturity of a healthcare organization. 
New ideas are welcomed while failure prompts 
inquiry rather than cover-up or blame.6
David Marx maintains that health profes-
sionals would openly admit that they have 
made a mistake, alert other operators when 
they see a risk and so participate in a learning 
culture.7 As a result, information about mis-
takes and near misses8 are shared within the 
3 The MaPSCAT (Manchester Patient Safety Culture 
Assessment Tool) is the result of collaboration between 
researchers in the UK and Canada interested in 
developing a safety culture tool. Refer to: M.P. Law, R. 
Zimmerman, G. R. Baker, T. Smith, Assessment of Safety 
Culture in a Hospital Setting, Healthcare Quarterly, 
Toronto, 13 (Sp) October 2010: 110-115
4 For an in-depth analysis see: A. Yassi, T. Hancock, 
Building a culture of safety to improve healthcare worker and 
patient well-being, Healthcare Quarterly, Toronto, 2005; 
8 Special No: 32-8
5 Generally, the story of healthcare systems is full of 
examples of user resistance to the imposition of changes 
and improvements because values, beliefs and norms 
are often interwoven with a professional tradition.
6 Regarding this topic, Westrum suggests that good 
information flow and processing have important effects 
on patient safety, such as a good teamwork and that an 
open and generative culture means a better uptake of 
innovations and response to danger signals. For a better 
understanding refer to: R. Westrum, Human factors 
experts beginning to focus on organizational factors in safety, 
ICAO Journal, 1996, Oct; 51(8): 6-8, 26-27
7 American Society for Healthcare Risk Management, 
R. Carroll (edited by), Risk Management Hand Book for 
Health Care Organizations, US, 2009, p. 9
8 A “near miss”is an event or a situation that could 
communicating the right signals from the 
leadership to employees is highly significant 
in the achievement of the whole process.
Safety culture  
in healthcare organizations
Of the utmost importance is that healthcare 
systems change the organizational culture in 
order to improve patient safety. Safety culture 
is one element of the organizational culture 
about which there has been a considerable so-
ciological research. The most commonly used 
definition of safety culture is the following: 
“The safety culture of a health organization 
is the product of individual and group values, 
attitudes, perceptions, competences and pat-
terns of behaviour that determine the commit-
ment to, and the style and proficiency of an or-
ganization’s health and safety management.”2
Growing interest with regard to safety cul-
ture within healthcare organizations has been 
accompanied by the need for assessment tools 
focused on the cultural aspects of patient safe-
ty improvement efforts. Attention has been 
paid to understanding the shared attitudes, 
beliefs, values and assumptions which un-
derlie how people perceive and act on safety 
issues in their health organizations and the 
potential relevance of these shared character-
istics to initiating fundamental and sustained 
changes to patient safety. The MaPSCAT ad-
vanced some dimensions developed in order 
2 The definition is from the Advisory Committee on 
the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI, 1993) in E. 
Coles, D. Smith, S. Tombs, Risk Management and Society, 
Netherlands, 2000, p. 11. For a better understanding 
of this particular topic please see: E.P. Borodzicz, Risk, 
Crisis and Security Management, England, 2005. Common 
terminology includes safety culture and safety climate 
with considerable variation in the use of terms and 
definitions. Safety climate is more specific and refers to 
the employees perceptions of particular aspects of the 
organization’s culture. In order to evaluate safety cli-
mate, Gershon et al. published a new healthcare safety 
climate measurement tool to determine its relationship 
to safe work behaviours. For and in-depth analysis re-
fer to: M. A. Blegen, A.P. Ginette, J. Rosse, Safety climate 
on Hospital Units: a new measure, in “Advances in patient 
safety: from research to implementation”, Volume 4: 
Programs, Tools and Products, Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, US, February, 2005
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practices.12 Joint Commission International13 
asserts that a just culture is not wholly blame-
free: it is one that has a clear and transparent 
process for evaluating errors and separating 
blameworthy from blameless acts.14 Obviously, 
leaders must consistently make safety a top 
priority in their decision-making. They should 
play an active visible role to articulate the vision 
and create the environment evaluating and im-
plementing changes and they should eliminate 
intimidating behaviour that suppresses the 
reporting of errors and unsafe conditions.15 Re-
garding these issues, the staff members need 
to believe that safety is taken very seriously by 
the organization in their own daily work and 
is focused on evaluating errors and incidents 
through the development of a framework with 
common programs and pathways to enhance 
safety and to achieve high quality standards.
Health care staff communication
It is recognized that the communication 
process can affect the safety and quality of pa-
tient care. Winya M.K. asserts that efforts to 
improve health care communication require 
an increased focus on the systemic and organi-
zational factors that could promote or inhibit 
patient-physician interactions.16
12 Regarding this matter, interventions to improve safety 
culture are interwoven with measurement approaches. 
The act of measuring sends signals to team members 
about the value of the organization. For a better analysis 
in terms of data collection and measurement strategies, 
see: M.D. Flotter, N. Khatri, G.T. Savage, Strategic human 
resource management in health care, UK, 2010, p. 111
13 Joint Commission Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations, founded in 1994 and based in Illinois, 
is one of the world’s leading non-profit patient safety 
organizations. Refer to: www.jointcommissioninterna-
tional.org
14 Joint Commission International, Leadership committed 




15 For a better analysis refer to: M.R. Chassin, Improving 
the quality of healthcare: what’s taking so long?, New 
England Journal of Medicine, US, 1996, October, 3 
16 M.K. Winya, Making it easier to do the right thing: a 
modern communication QI Agenda, Patient Education and 
Counselling, Ireland, 2012 (Sept), 88 (3): 364-366
team, so they can prevent similar situations. 
This also helps operators to avoid incorrect 
and reckless behaviour. 
An important step in creating a safety cul-
ture is to overcome the current fear of punitive 
outcomes involved in error reporting.9 Time 
and again health operators are concerned with 
the negative consequences of disclosing errors, 
such as malpractice litigation, reputation dam-
age, job security and personal feelings. Larson 
states that breakdowns occur when profession-
als differ on how to trade goals, do not clearly 
define rules and responsibilities and fail to 
communicate updates to a shared plan.10 He 
also asserts that it is fundamental to create a 
common shared vocabulary about safety issues 
and adverse events,11 which could be used in in-
formal conversation during daily interactions 
among staff. Moreover, it is important how the 
feedback to staff on information from an error 
is used. Besides, effective supervision has to fo-
cus on the provision to all employees of instruc-
tion, mentoring, training and above all support 
and mutual reinforcement of safe working 
have resulted in an accident, injury or illness, but did 
not, either by chance or through timely intervention. 
Because it is caught in time, no harm is caused to the 
patient. The near miss should be considered as a chance 
to develop preventive strategies and actions.
9 Some explanations for errors not being reported 
include: fear of blame from administration, physicians 
and patients; non supportive management response; 
and the effort of reporting. Regarding this tool, James 
Reason suggests that a healthcare safety culture should 
include adequate reporting systems, action taken on 
the basis of the reports, flexibility and learning from 
experience. For an in-depth analysis refer to: J. Reason, 
The Human Error, Cambridge, 1990
10 For a better analysis of this topic, please read: C. 
Larson, F.M.J. LaFasto, Teamwork: what must go right/
what must go wrong, UK, 1989
11 An “adverse event” is a serious incident, therapeutic 
misadventure, iatrogenic injuries or other adverse 
occurrences directly associated with care provided. An 
“error” has to be considered as the failure of a planned 
action to be completed as intended or the use of a wrong 
plan with actual or potential negative consequences for 
the patient. For a better understanding refer to: E. J. 
Thomas, L. A. Petersen, Measuring Errors and Adverse Events 
in Healthcare, Journal of General Internal Medicine, US, 
2003 Jan; 18(1): 61-67
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cation among health professionals, protects 
patients against damage, and promotes care 
continuity and improvement. In addition, re-
cords should cover all phases of the transplan-
tation process, ranging from the donation to 
the hospital discharge of transplant recipients.
Furthermore, the health organizations and 
teamwork involved in the systematic actions 
should document incidents and deviations 
from established procedures and specifica-
tions. Documentation would enable all steps 
and all data affecting the quality and safety of 
the organs, tissues and cells to be checked and 
traced, from the donor to the recipient.19 This 
is very important because written documen-
tation ensures that work is standardized and 
also prevents errors that may result from oral 
communication.20 
Priority should be given to investigation 
and reporting of incidents with demonstrat-
ed or potential risk to cause serious adverse 
events. 
According to Politosky G., Coolican M. and 
Casey K., procedures should be developed 
through the collaboration of the major organi-
zations involved in the care of donor families 
and transplant recipients in order to standard-
ize communication practices.21
Errors and adverse events management
Studies related to medical errors have re-
sulted in growing awareness of patient safety 
issues within healthcare systems. Global effort 
has been placed on patient safety in general 
and, particularly on adverse and sentinel event 
19 Council of Europe (edited by), Guide to safety and 
quality assurance for the transplantation of organs, tissues 
and cells, Strasbourg, 2009, p. 18; website: www.edqm.eu 
20 A safety culture exists within an organization which 
promotes the open reporting of errors and incidents and 
encourages the consequent improvements in practice 
that investigations of such events can bring. All team 
members have to share the responsibility to participate 
in the evaluation of risk and in the implementation of 
appropriate strategies for error prevention during the 
whole donation-transplant process.
21 G. Politoski, M. Coolican, K. Casey, Perspectives on 
communication issues among transplant and procurement 
professionals, transplant recipients and donor families, US, 
1996, Jun, 6 (2): 78-83
The creation of a good donor organ acquisi-
tion process depends on all team members in-
volved and a good quality of communication. 
This, along with sharing of experiences gained 
in different ways, can improve the mutual un-
derstanding of the transplant process. Inten-
sive care staff play a central role in the process 
of donor organ acquisition in identifying a 
potential donor, in taking care of the relatives’ 
need for pertinent information and in brief-
ing them on the question of organ donation.17 
Communication failures may occur, particu-
larly with regard to cross-disciplinary inter-
actions. Common causes of errors leading to 
adverse events include organizational factors 
such as: lack of communication or miscommu-
nication; lack of attention to safety guidelines 
and procedures; excessive workload and; insuf-
ficient staff members for specified tasks. Many 
people believe that communication is simply 
the act of sending a clear message to someone, 
but just sending a message does not result in 
action if reception does not occur. Commu-
nication is effective when it is in context and 
linked to the receiver and not only to the trans-
fer of data. Top-down communication has to be 
replaced by a two-way model which includes 
feedback to the leadership. Silence about harm-
ful events would be replaced with open disclo-
sure about serious patient safety events which 
would allow for organizational learning from 
accidents. In the event of reporting, coordina-
tors would take a non-punitive approach in 
order to identify problems and work towards 
their resolution following the logic of learning 
improvement. Some of the common barriers 
to reporting errors or accidents include: the 
limited knowledge about what and how to re-
port; the desire to forget the event and; the fear 
of reprisals or punishment.18
Documenting, registering and filing re-
ports of care provided improves communi-
17 K. Meyer, I. T. Bjork, Change of focus: from intensive 
care towards organ donation, European Society for Organ 
Transplantation, 21 (2008), 133-139
18 In order to overcome these problems leaders could 
use some strategies to facilitate reporting, such as 
standard reporting formats immediately available to 
the team professionals.
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which consists of a process used to discern the 
underlying reasons for an adverse event in 
order to prevent the recurrence of a harmful 
outcome or a near miss. In the organ trans-
plantation process, the possibility to increase 
safety seems greater using proactive research, 
mainly centred on organizational process to-
gether with a retrospective analysis but not 
limited to adverse event reports in addition 
to application of previously shared guidelines 
and protocols.25 Failure mode and effects criti-
cal analysis (FMECA) is used to identify when, 
where and how processes might fail.26 It also 
emphasizes prevention rather than reacting 
to problems or adverse events. A deeper un-
derstanding as to why a particular error or ad-
verse event occurred, and with less focus on 
the individual who made the error, could have 
positive outcomes.27 The reporting of errors, 
near misses and adverse events should be en-
couraged as these are viewed as opportunities 
to identify and improve processes of care.28 
Barriers to reporting are: the fear of discipli-
nary action; the fear of inappropriate disclo-
sure to others, seen as unnecessary paperwork 
and not seeing the value in reporting and; es-
pecially, the fear of being named in legal ac-
tion resulting from the error/incident. As for 
Legal Medical aspects, there are no specific 
sanctions for healthcare professionals since 
quality is based on transparency and collabo-
ration as well as efficiency and suitability of 
all phases of the donation-removal-transplant 
process. According to European Directives on 
adverse events it is mandatory to have a quality 
25 R. Pretagostini, F. Gabbrielli, P. Fiaschetti, A. Oliveti, 
S. Cenci, D. Peritore, D. Stabile, Risk management. Systems 
for healthcare and safety development on transplantation: a 
review and a proposal, 2010, May, 42(4): 1014-6
26 FMECA is made up of four steps: failure modes 
(what could go wrong?); failure causes (why did the 
failure happen?); failure effects (what would be the 
consequences of each failure?); failure prevention (how 
can we prevent a bad result when there is a failure?). 
For an in depth analysis see: L. Norris, Transplant 
Administration, US, 2014
27 B. Hoffmann, J. Rohe, Patient safety and error 
management. What causes adverse events and how can they 
be prevented?, 2010, Feb; 107(6): 92-99
28 J. Reason, Human Error: models and management, 
quoted, 768-770
management. Generally, errors have been clas-
sified by various authors according to task, 
system and behaviour including diagnostic, 
therapeutic, and preventive. Many however 
are actually due to communicative mistakes.
James Reason considers error as “a gener-
ic term to encompass all those occasions in 
which a planned sequence of mental or phys-
ical activities fails to achieve its intended out-
come, and when these failures cannot be at-
tributed to the intervention of some chance 
agency”.22 
Reason’s type of error extends Jens Rasmus-
sen’s skill-rule-knowledge model of human 
behaviour. Rasmussen defines skill-based be-
haviours as a performance governed by pre-
programmed instructions. A primary differ-
ence between rule and knowledge-based error 
is information flow. Feedback - what was done 
and its outcome - represents the control mech-
anism required to prevent future knowledge-
based errors.23
Human error plays a crucial role where lack 
of training and knowledge, failure to follow 
procedures, fatigue and overwork, all con-
tribute to adverse outcomes.24 When an ad-
verse event is identified, the transplant centre 
must document and notify the event using the 
case analysis as represented in order to effect 
changes in policies and practices to prevent re-
peated incidents.
The most common way to investigate an 
adverse event is the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) 
22 J. Reason, Human error, quoted, p. 9.
23 J. Reason correlates types of error with three types 
of behaviour: slips, resulting from a failure of skill by 
inattention or over attention; lapses, which result from 
a failure of good rules or the application of knowledge; 
mistakes, which emanate from a failure or lack of 
expertise. For a better understanding of this topic, see: J. 
Reason, Human error: models and management, UK, 2000, 
Mar 18; 320 (7237): 768-770
24 Adverse events are usually caused by many 
interrelated factors and some of them are related to 
the organization and processes, while some are due 
to human error. Some examples of adverse events 
during the transplantation process are: the unintended 
transmission of infectious agents to a recipient; ABO 
incompatibility between donor and recipient; living 
donor failure; living donor organs retrieved but not 
transplanted.
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Donation-removal-transplant process: 
research in FVG regarding adverse 
reactions and no damage to the patient.
Donation, removal and transplant activi-
ties are presently articulated on three levels: 
a national level with the National Transplant 
Centre, a regional and an interregional level 
with a Regional and an Interregional Refer-
ence Centre for Transplant and a Local Coordi-
nation level.
The Regional Transplant Centre coordinates 
data collection and data transmission to patients 
on the transplant wait list as well as removal ac-
tivity and communication with resuscitation 
rooms on the territory; it controls immunologi-
cal testing prior to transplant, it assigns organs 
and handles contacts with the interregional 
centre of reference, with regional and health au-
thorities and with voluntary associations.
Interregional Coordination makes use of 
three interregional organizations that cover 
the whole National territory. Each single phase 
is accompanied by structures that depend both 
from the National Transplant Centre and the 
Ministry of Health.
High quality management of coordination 
centres (locally, regionally and inter-regional-
ly speaking) is a basic premise and a must in 
order to reach a complete clinical policy of the 
donation-transplant process. Furthermore, 
it must offer the highest possible operative 
guarantee in terms of efficiency and effective-
ness to the whole system. Local coordination, 
in particular, controls and facilitates the whole 
process leading to organ removal in compli-
ance with National Laws and guidelines. It 
manages identification of potential donors 
as well as their suitability and manages rela-
tionship with donors’ families. It handles all 
paperwork connected to organ removal and 
transmission of all potential donors’ data to 
the Regional and Inter-regional Centre.
The transplant process is highly complex, 
mainly due to the speed that an efficient organ-
ization needs while performing all required 
functions. Therefore, each phase of the process 
must be meticulously performed. Starting 
from the required operative process analysis 
management system for adverse events noti-
fication or for serious reactions. The National 
Transplant Centre drafted several documents 
and among them a card for adverse events and 
adverse reaction notification.29 It is the re-
sponsibility of every individual professional 
to report a patient safety occurrence whether 
or not it reached the patient and whether or 
not it caused harm. In this way, simple human 
errors and behaviours where risk is not recog-
nized will be individually evaluated with the 
focus on understanding the reasons for errors 
and so creating the conditions for behavioural 
modifications.
Personal punishment would be self-defeat-
ing since blaming a single individual would 
hinder collaboration among professionals 
involved. Sanctions applied to healthcare 
personnel are mainly generic, as provided 
by public Hospital Corporations disciplinary 
codes and by the Penal Code, when the of-
fense is prosecutable ex officio or involves le-
gal action by the parties.
All of the above is due to the fact that the 
very many control systems, both those pre-ar-
ranged by applied legislative regulations ad-
opted by the Italian Government, and those 
following protocols, internal codes and proce-
dures, in the vast majority of cases only report 
near miss cases or preventable events which 
do not cause any damage to the patient.Timely 
communication of an adverse event by health-
care personnel to CRT-FVG30 is of the utmost 
importance since it reduces or eliminates the 
consequences of the event itself during all 
the following stages of the donation-remov-
al-transplant process.
29 Furthermore, to maintain required National 
quality and efficiency standards some forms of 
institutional accreditation have been especially set 
for this kind of surgery. Centro Regionale Trapianti of 
Friuli Venezia Giulia has set a monitoring and quick 
reporting system for events and adverse reactions 
as required by the regulation 2010/45/UE on quality 
and safety of human organs intended for transplant. 
For an in-depth analysis of the European Union 
Directive 2010/45/UE, see: M.G. Ison, J.L. Holl, D. 
Ladner, Preventable errors in organ transplantation: an 
emerging Patient Safety Issue?, Am J Transplant, 2012, 
Sep; 12(9) : 2307-2312
30 Centro Regionale Trapianti, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Italy.
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second opinion): Potentially critical situation: 
anamnesis, failure to adopt diagnostic pref-
erential operational protocols on potential 
donor, failure to transmit original medical 
reports; Consequences: need to clarify anamne-
sis doubts through targeted surveys, delayed 
procedures and temporary stalemate situa-
tion, possible incongruence between what has 
been transmitted on the phone and/or what 
has been transcribed by the operator.
5. Maintenance (Resuscitator): Potentially 
critical situation: unsuitable monitoring of re-
quested parameters; Consequences: unsuitable 
donor care, hemodynamic instability.
6. Talking to relatives (Resuscitator and/or 
Local Coordinator): communication and rela-
tionship with potential donor relatives repre-
sent one of the most critical points of the whole 
process. Although each interview is different, it 
should always be planned with a methodology 
based on a sequential and clearly phases in any 
aspect that may influence its result. The request 
of donation should be stated clearly, directly 
and in plain and understandable language with 
an exaltation of values: the donation should be 
offered as an option, right, privilege, or a possi-
bility of helping others.34 Furthermore, no max-
imum time for the interview should be pre-
established. Potentially critical situation: hasty 
communication using strictly technical lan-
guage takes place in unprotected environment; 
proposal for donation is made before clinical 
death has actually been notified, insufficient 
amount of time given to family members to ask 
for explanations and details; Consequences: inad-
equate understanding by family members with 
temporary stalemate and consequent delays; 
disoriented and confused family members; dis-
appointment, distrust towards the healthcare 
system resulting in denied donation.
7. Lymph nodes removal and peripheral 
blood collection for immunological character-
ization (Local Coordinator, Local Surgeon, In-
34 Organizaciòn Nacional De Trasplantes, Good Practice 
Guidelines in the process of Organ Donation, Madrid, Spain, 
2011, page 54
to identification of professionals, procedures 
and methodologies to be followed considering 
that, according to Italian experience, on aver-
age we have a 10 hours lapse between donor 
identification and actual transplant surgery.31 
S. Venettoni itemizes the whole process into a 
series of phases and he identifies the profession-
als involved during each phase as well as critical 
situations and possible consequences.32 Talking 
about communication among healthcare pro-
fessionals he identifies the following steps:
1. Locate potential donor (Local Coordinator, 
Resuscitator): Potentially critical situation: inad-
equate Local Coordinator integration with hos-
pital diagnostic units: Consequences: failure to 
identify potential tissue and organ donors.
2. Diagnosis, assessment and certification 
of death (Resuscitator or/and Local Coordi-
nator, committee): Potentially critical situation: 
lack of communication with Healthcare Man-
agement or failure to activate Medical Units 
during death assessment and certification 
phases; Consequences: failure to apply refer-
ence standards, loss of potential donor, failure 
to perform transplant to wait list patients.
3. Notification of potential donor to per-
taining CRT/CIR33: (Resuscitator and/or Local 
Coordinator): Potentially critical situation: late 
reporting, notification lacking indispensable 
information for early evaluation; Consequenc-
es: donor kept alive beyond established ob-
servation period, logistic and organizational 
problems for organ removal units.
4. Early suitability assessment (Resuscita-
tor and/or Local Coordinator, Coordination, 
31 The whole donation-removal-transplant process 
consists of resuscitation, management, coordination 
centre, immunology laboratory, diagnostic services, 
transplant centre, emergency call centre and transport 
companies.
32 S. Venettoni, Il processo di donazione-prelievo-trapianto: 
analisi delle procedure e criticità, www.salute.gov.it/
imgs/C_17_pubblicazioni_645_allegato.pdf, site 
consulted 22/12/2014
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all structure internal services. Potentially criti-
cal situation: selected patient cannot be found, 
very limited time for patient transportation to 
transplant centre, insufficient collaboration 
between support systems within the trans-
plant centre, late communication to inten-
sive care unit for support during forthcoming 
transplant, lacking or delayed communication 
to transfusion cent on forthcoming transplant 
surgery; Consequences: transplant may not be 
performed on selected patient, transplant is 
performed in a location authorized only for 
certain types of transplant that may not be 
the needed one, difficult patient care during 
the after-transplant phase, no bed available in 
the intensive care unit, blood units may not be 
available if transfusion is needed.
14. Follow-up (Transplant centres and/or spe-
cialized units located in patient residence area): 
Potentially critical situation: failure to identify per-
son in charge of the follow-up unit, there should 
only be one doctor instead of several profes-
sionals; Consequences: irregular relationship be-
tween doctor and patient, possible surgery du-
plication, follow-up phase is not personalized.
15. Logistics aspects regarding equipment 
and biological material transportation (Coor-
dination centres, transplant centres, transpor-
tation systems): poor management of logistics 
aspects may cause delays and/or serious prob-
lems during each phase of the process.
Hereafter, chart Nr.1 lists all adverse events 
caused by communication and management 
problems throughout the donation-removal-
transplant process in the FVG region during 
2011-2013. Chart Nr.2 lists all near miss and 
non-conformity situations in FVG during the 
same period.
After collecting all cards for adverse events 
notification, CRT of FVG creates its own data-
base for further elaboration and information 
management. Risk evaluation is carried out ac-
cording to seriousness/consequences (G) and 
danger/repetition frequency (R). These two va-
riables provide a score (S) that classifies both the 
event and the procedures to be implemented.
tensive Care Unit personnel): Potentially criti-
cal situation: lack of information that goes with 
the material, difficulties and/or not timely 
biological material transport activation; Con-
sequences: procedure errors and mistaken po-
tential donor identification.
8. Consulting assignment lists (Coordina-
tion of CIR/CRT, transplant Centres): Poten-
tially critical situation: patient list has not been 
updated with new entries, patient list lacking 
recent medical information; Consequences: fail-
ure to select new patient for organ transplant.
9. Summon of transplant receivers
10. Instrumental-diagnostic in-depth analy-
sis (Resuscitator, Local Coordinator, diagnos-
tic services, healthcare personnel).
11. Organ and tissue removal and second 
suitability evaluation (Surgeons, second 
opinion): Potentially critical situation: several 
surgical teams are in the operating room at 
the same time, surgical personnel has not 
been informed on removal program (i.e. 
timing, team, organs to be removed), surgi-
cal personnel with limited previous experi-
ence; Consequences: chaotic organization of 
surgical phases, inadequate organization 
and management support during surgical 
procedure.
12. Planned Surgery and third suitability 
evaluation (Transplant Surgeon, Pathological 
anatomy): Potentially critical situation: failure to 
transmit organ medical documents especially 
in cases when the organ has been removed by a 
medical team other than the transplant team; 
Consequences: failure to evaluate proper organ 
quality and functionality due to lack of docu-
ments, not enough info for the receiver on or-
gan he/she is about to be transplanted with.
13. Transplant (Transplant Surgeon, Diag-
nostic system): organ transplant is a highly 
complex surgical procedure and implies great 
responsibility. It involves the whole transplant 
system and calls for total collaboration among 
11
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Chart 2 - Near miss and non conformity situations at CRT-FVG, 2011-2013.
Chart 1 – Signalling adverse events at CRT-FVG, 2011-2013.
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proactive and reactive intervention) are in-
dispensable for Clinical Risk Management to-
gether with use of proper tools for prevention, 
identification of adverse events, report man-
agement, data collecting and widespread use 
of specific information systems.
A constantly active computerized system mo-
nitoring and managing all activity phases, 
should guarantee data traceability and its tran-
sfer to the laboratory located on the donation 
site, without the need for manual transcrip-
tion of vital data, thus allowing better techni-
cal and clinical evaluation of all gathered in-
formation.
A safety culture is characterized by a con-
tinual drive toward the goal of maximum at-
tainable safety. The following flow-chart lists 
the best strategies to avoid communication 
problems within the coordination system, to 
improve the relationship between healthcare 
professionals and patient’s family members, 
for a safe and successful donation-transplant 
process.
Results
According to the above mentioned issues 
we can see how communication errors are 
mainly due to mistaken or incorrect use of 
information, data collection and analysis and 
difficulties in the use of feedback to better 
evaluate data received near real time. If we 
can solve these problems we may guarantee a 
safer process and will be able to better moni-
tor our activities, avoiding critical situations.
Coordination programs should be institut-
ed in every “organ generating” hospital using 
highly motivated well-trained professionals 
who act in compliance with agreed protocols 
and ethical principles.35 Interventions for the 
improvement of safety include: team train-
ing, leadership walk-arounds, safety audits, 
event reporting and analysis systems, inter-
active group briefings and debriefings and 
performance feedback focusing on how hu-
man factors interact with high risk situations. 
In this regard, Spanish hospitals have intro-
duced a network of healthcare professionals 
responsible for organ donation and ensuring 
the involvement of all concerned in the qual-
ity of the process, the patient safety and care 
effectiveness.36 Healthcare professionals can 
use the research results to transfer evidence to 
their clinical practice and, furthermore, could 
improve results and support the approach and 
monitoring of donors, transplant candidates 
and recipients. Continuing education, associ-
ated with clinical practice, allows operators to 
progress from learning professionals to expert 
professionals in critical areas and to become 
involved in complex decisions.37 Personnel 
involvement and basic knowledge (glossa-
ry, taxonomy, detection technology, analysis,
 
35 Knowledge and competences are significant factors 
which could improve a shared understanding of the 
value of the teamwork.
36 For an in-depth analysis, see: Organizacion Nacional 
De Transplantes, Good practice guidelines in the process of 
organ donation, quoted, 47-62
37 I. Tonalak, R. Emiroglu, H. Karakayali, N. Bilgin, 
M. Haberal, The importance of continuing education 
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LEGEND
Class A: Communication management inside the teamwork itself 
Class B: Management of conversation and support of family members
Class C: Training of human resources on clinical risk management during donation-removal-transplant process
Performance











Too many different 
professionals resulting in 
incorrect collection of data 
Personalized follow-up 
management / Timely 
communication of relevant info Coordinator, 
surgeons, 
resuscitator, 







Cooperation, exchange and share 
information (A2)
Distorted communication, 
logistic and organizational 
difficulties/ Difficult patient 
clinical follow up 
Proper coordination of activities 
among operators involved in 
different phases
Management of emotional 
self-control and conflict solving 
among operators (A3)
Discontinuous relationship, 
anxiety and preoccupation 
affecting organization
Emotional self-control, capacity 
to mediate and manage conflicts
Correct logistics and 
transportation management (A4)
Delays and possible 
duplicated action
Respect of delivery times for 






Selection of context and 
information recipients (B1)
Choice of non-protected 
environment






Proper skills in managing 
conversation with family 
members (B2)
Failure to respect 
conversation sequence, 
distorted information 
received by recipients of the 
message
Correct data collection / 
Conversation and information 
sequences has been respected
Use of cultural mediator (B3)
Family members 
understanding of medical 
language has been 
underestimated
Proper evaluation of family 
members capability to 
understand medical language
Possibility for feedback and 
clarification (B4)
Unilateral communication
Listening capability, according 
to feedback timing
Activation of psychological 
-emotional help and support (B5)
Hasty and detached 
communication finalized 
at obtaining permission for 
donation
Establish a help and 
psychological-emotional 
support relationship with 







Knowledge and application of 
proper procedure/protocol for 
identification system and clinical 
risk analysis and prevention (C1)
Insufficient knowledge of all 
donation-removal-transplant 
process procedures as  well 
as incorrect information of 
potential damage events
Knowledge of different phases 
of the donation-removal-






Timely communication of near 
miss situations, adverse events 
and sentinel events following 




Proper Training of personnel 
able to handle immediate event 
information, according to 
protocol regarding prevention 
and GRC
Support human resources 
training development (C3)
Difficult application of 
knowledge, failure to transfer 
and improve best practice 
activity.
Favour participation to audit, 
briefing and Sea / application 
of FMECA, RCA, SWA / support 
educational growth using ECM 
system
Flow-chart regarding communication among health care professionals and families towards organ donation.
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culture that supports staff and instils in health 
operators a sense of ownership of their work 
processes in order to prevent the clinical risk. 
Daniela Zamolo, pedagogist specialized in adult 
training projects and Quality Management in the 
European Healthcare Systems, presently employed 
at AOUD.
Conclusions
The donation and transplantation pro-
cess requires a progressive change in health 
culture. A transplant represents the final act 
of a long, complex, multi-professional and 
multi-factorial journey. All phases must be 
systematically coordinated using all available 
tools for risk identification and evaluation in 
order to improve the whole process.
Synergy between proper use of tools, logis-
tics, cooperation, efficient verbal and on-line 
communication, proper training of all profes-
sionals involved in all phases, are the premis-
es for a well coordinated and high quality do-
nation-removal-transplant process, keeping 
safety and high quality standards as a must. All 
healthcare professionals should receive pro-
fessional training on donation issues in order 
to create confidence and proficiency within 
the whole process.38
Adverse events are unexpected occurrences 
that may cause unintentional and undesirable 
damage to the patient. Warning systems set to 
prevent such events are an indispensable tool 
to gain a better understanding of causes and 
risk factors. Based on the “learning from your 
mistakes” principle, new prevention strate-
gies should be established to improve patient 
safety. Therefore, the management-organiza-
tion process plays a crucial role and calls for 
the utmost professional commitment by all 
personnel involved at different levels in the 
donation-removal-transplant process. Roles 
must be properly assigned to achieve fluidity 
during each and every phase of the said process 
although overall culture and safety behaviour 
can improve the performance and optimize 
the work flow. A safe clinical environment is 
strengthened when work processes allow lead-
ers and staff to discuss and learn about safety 
issues.39 Leaders, at all levels, have to create a 
38 Continuous training should be implemented to facilitate 
effective communication among team members during 
potential donor cases. Therefore, quality control of patient 
care is needed as well as communication and cooperation 
within the staff.
39 Joint Commission International, Leadership committed 
to safety. Sentinel Event Alert, quoted, web site consulted 
10.01.2015
